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ABSTRACT
We resolve the determinacy paradox.
Will free trade with political science put normative
economists out of work? Normative economics has traditionally
given advice to a "puppet government"-a government "whose role is
to echo the policy that the economist, presented with technocratic
information on the economy and choosing an appropriate objective
function, proposes as the optimal one from a set of policy
instruments" [Bhagwati, 1990]. Intellectual free trade with
political science forces economists to realize that governments are
not puppets-or, at least, not their puppets. Without puppets, is
there any job for puppeteers?
Consider, for instance, Tabellini and Alesina's [1990] model of
voting on the budget deficit.1 The current majority of voters is
unsure whether it will be the majority in the future; perhaps another
group with different tastes about the composition of government
will be the majority then. This gives the current majority an
incentive to finance its spending by issuing debt, because the burden
of paying off the debt will fall on a government that might want to
alter the composition of government spending from the one the
current majority favors. Ex ante, before anyone knew what her
tastes were, everyone would be better off with a balanced budget
rule, but once the game has begun and people know who they are, the
current majority always wants to run an excessive deficit.
What are the policy implications of the Tabellini-Alesina
model? There aren't any. Tabellini and Alesina's goal is to explain
public policies, not to rank them. Governments act the way they
must; they are not waiting for Tabellini and Alesina to tell them
what to do. One can engage in variational exercises, to be sure-
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asking, for instance, what the effect of a balanced budget
amendment would be.2 But variational exercises are not policy
recommendations; they are counterfactual explorations like Fogel's
[1964] reconstruction of American history without railroads.
Nothing is wrong, of course, with models that don't have policy
implications. Neither the meteorite theory of dinosaur extinction,
for instance, nor the big bang theory of cosmology has any policy
implications that we can discern. No one would criticize them on
this account. Like the Tabellini-Alesina model, they invite
variational exercises-one can speculate, for instance, on whether
dinosaurs would have developed opposable thumbs or differential
calculus if the meteorite had missed. Such speculations, however,
are not policy recommendations; indeed, they already have a name of
their own-science fiction.
But especially for a teleological group like economists, models
without policy implications may seem like trips without a
destination or tennis games without a score. Many economists like
to think of themselves as active participants in history, not as
members of a contemplative order trying to understand a world they
cannot influence, or even as science fiction writers. We write op-ed
pieces and letters to the editor, sign advertisements, appear on
television shows, testify before Congressional committees, and
sometimes even try to take presidents and presidential candidates
under our tutelage. The White House has a Council of Economic
Advisers, but not a Council of Paleo-Archeological or Cosmological
Advisers. For many economists, what makes economics more
appealing than cosmology is the possibility of drawing policy
implications and influencing the course of history.
Once models like Tabellini-Alesina, however, open up
intellectual trade between economics and political science, these
hopes seem to be futile and the actions they inspire futile. This is
the "determinacy paradox" [Bhagwati, Brecher, and Srinivasan 1984,
Bhagwati 1984, 1990]. The grand conditions of political-economic
equilibrium (whatever they may be) have already determined what
will happen. Telling the government to lower tariffs makes no more
sense than telling a monopolist to lower prices or telling the
dinosaurs to wear overcoats. (Basu [1992] makes a similar point.)
So the unemployment of normative economists that this kind
of free trade threatens is not a happy prospect. In this paper we
will argue that such unemployment is not inevitable, although most
popular re-employment schemes are doomed to failure. Free trade
opens up opportunities, but these cannot be exploited if people
continue to think and act in the old ways. We are presenting a way
to think about retraining normative economists. The chief purpose
of this paper will be to outline the new ways of thinking and acting
that are appropriate in a free trade regime. The new ways, it turns
out, are not really new at all: they are the methods that Marx and
Keynes, among others, used to great effect.
Before we can do that, we will first try to persuade readers of
the seriousness of the challenge that the determinacy paradox
presents. We will do this by showing the inadequacy of the three
popular responses to free trade with political science-
protectionism, constitutionalism, and multiple equilibria. There is
no easy way out.
In section 3 we begin tackling the difficult problem that the
determinacy paradox presents. We start with a fundamental
philosophical question: in what sense can we think of our own
actions as being freely chosen? The question is fundamental
because if all of our own thoughts and deeds are also determined by
the conditions of grand political-economic equilibrium, we can have
no more hope of influencing the course of events than a rock can.
The answer we give to this question will show why giving advice
can, under proper circumstances, be a sensible activity.
With this background, section 4 turns to the question of how to
give advice. Advice stands a chance of being taken only when it is
given by certain people to certain other people at certain times; this
section is about identifying those pairs and times. Section 5
concludes.
2. FALSE ESCAPES FROM THE DETERMINACY PARADOX
A. Protectionism
Can unemployment of economic advisers be avoided simply by
restricting the flow of ideas from political science to economics?
Such an outcome is neither feasible nor desirable.
It is not feasible because economists don't have a government
that can coerce them not to trade; there is no way to punish
deviations. The genie is out of the bottle: increasing numbers of
economists are now in the game of building models where policies
are endogenous and governments matter.
Nor is it desirable: governments really are not economists'
puppets, and to pretend that they are merely invites derision and
wastes intellectual resources.Such ostrich-like behavior can carry a
heavy price. In the field of transportation, for instance, economists
have known since at least 1952 that peak-hour toll schemes on the
Hudson River crossings could make people in the New York
metropolitan area a lot better off, and yet we have no idea of why
these schemes have not been implemented or what steps could be
taken that would get them implemented.
B. Constitutionalism
Buchanan and Tullock [1962], and writers who have followed in
the tradition they established, have looked at constitutional design
as the key arena in which normative economists can make a
contribution. Once a constitution is in place, political-economic
equilibrium is determined and there is no longer any room for advice.
So what economists (and political scientists) need to do is devise a
constitution that will lead to a good equilibrium. To this task
Buchanan, Tullock, and their followers have devoted considerable
wisdom, ingenuity, and effort.
This approach is in fact only a slight modification of the
traditional practice of advising puppets; the only difference is that
it takes constitutional conventions to be the puppets instead of
everyday governments. It takes the actions of constitutional
conventions to be exogenous, rather than the actions of governments.
There is, however, no reason to believe that constitutional
conventions are autonomous, unmoved movers, any more than
everyday governments are, or that they are any more receptive to
economists1 advice than the San Andreas fault is.3 Anyone who has
read the section of the New Jersey constitution dealing with senior
citizen bingo games [article IV, section VIM, paragraph 2.A] or the
section of the Pennsylvania constitution dealing with police and fire
collective bargaining [article III, section 31] would be hard pressed
to think that these provisions emerged from any process
quantitatively different from normal legislation.4
C. Multiple equilibria
Often, economists will give the impression that multiple
equilibria can fortuitously provide the freedom that policy
intervention requires. They will show that a certain model has
multiple equilibria, and then (usually in the paper's conclusion)
argue that this multiplicity gives the government or some other
benevolent entity an opportunity to intervene and kick the system to
one of the more desirable equilibria. A deus ex machina appears at
the end of these stories, and the authors argue that its actions are
plausible because nothing else in the story contradicts anything
about it. Thus even though the equilibria might arise from solving an
endogenous policy model, normatively the economist is still left
with a function: she can rank order two or more equilibria, and
resurrect the role of policy adviser.
Why aren't multiple equilibria a good way to escape the
determinacy paradox? Because multiple equilibria are signs of
incomplete modelling, not of actual freedom. In reality, only one
thing happens. Multiple equilibria say something about the logical
structure of a model; they say nothing about the reality that the
model is trying to capture.
Consider a classical symmetrical battle-of-the-sexes game.
Under any popular refinement, such a game has two equilibria—both
players go to the ballet and both players go to the football game. By
that statement is meant that both outcomes are fully compatible
with everything stated in the model-the payoff functions, the
temporal sequence, the rationality description, the information
structure, and so on. However, the couple will either go to the ballet
or they will go to the football game; they will not go to both.
Whatever it is that determines which they go to is something we
have left out of the model-perhaps who is stronger or more
persistent. All we know now is that the information the model uses
is insufficient to answer the question, "Where will they go?" As a
way of answering this question, the model is a failure.
But the fact that a particular model fails to answer this
question doesn't mean that no. model can answer this question or
that the couple is waiting around for a benevolent economist to tell
them what to do. Something left out of the model matters. This
particular model's failure doesn't give us the freedom to impose any
answer we want. Having a calculator that doesn't take square roots,
does not entitle you to assert that the square root of 7 is 5.
An example with a model not usually thought of as having
multiple equilibria can make the point clearer. The theory of human
capital is compatible with the president of General Motors wearing a
red tie and also compatible with his wearing a blue tie; so there are
(at least) two equilibria. We conclude from the existence of these
multiple equilibria that the theory of human capital is not very
useful if we are interested in tie color-but no one ever claimed it
was. We do not conclude that the president's tie color is
indeterminate or that we can tell him what color tie to wear. We
conclude only that to answer tie color questions we need another
model. The same conclusion should be reached whenever multiple
equilibria are encountered.
3. FREE TO ADVISE?
Thus the determinacy paradox is a real problem. Better models
endogenize more actors and explain more actions, and so a demand
that some actor be considered exogenous or some action be
unexplained seems to be a demand for poorer models. Normative
economics seems to be simply bad economics. "Tout comprendre,
c'est tout pardonner," and so how can the drive to understand the
world be reconciled with the urge to improve it?
We think there's a way to make this reconciliation. Normative
economics can make a difference in the world, or, at least, we ought
to act as if it could.
To understand how, we need to begin at a very rudimentary
level. Consider the decisions we make about how to conduct our
personal lives-what we will eat for breakfast, what order we will
eat it in, how we will travel to work, what papers we will write,
what we will say in those papers, what order we will say it in.
For a social scientist who had constructed a very good model
of the Columbia economics department, our actions would be
completely endogenous. Something caused us to drink orange juice
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before milk, and such a social scientist could explain what that
something was. Private life seems to be prey to the same sort of
determinacy paradox that bedevils public life.5
And yet when we think about whether to drink orange juice or
what article to write, we believe we are making real decisions-
decisions that are neither foreordained nor ineffective. We pause
and scratch our heads and wonder, "What should I do?" We believe
these decisions are effective in the sense that if we decide on a
feasible action, then we will do it. Friedman wrote a book about
decisions like these and called it Free to Choose [1980].
In what sense, then, are we really "free to choose" in private
life? Answering this question will start us on the track to
understanding normative economics.
In private life, we think of ourselves as free to choose because
the hypothetical social scientist studying the Columbia economics
department makes no difference to the actual conduct of our lives.
Whether or not such a social scientist is around, we still have to
think about what to eat for breakfast, what sentence to put next in
this paper, what conclusion to come to in the next paper. Knowing
that a book of our lives might exist makes no difference if we
cannot read it and find out what we are going to do. Even if we could
read the book of our lives we would have to decide whether to
believe it--whence Newcomb's problem [Nozick, 1969].6 As Levi
[1991, chapter 4] argues, we cannot predict our own decisions before
we make them; otherwise we would have already made them. Thus
worrying what to eat for breakfast is compatible with having a
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scientific world view. We might as well act as if we were free to
choose.
Giving and receiving advice, too, are compatible with a
scientific world view. Since it makes sense to worry about what to
eat for breakfast, it makes sense to learn about nutrition, cooking,
and the prices in various supermarkets. Since it makes sense to
worry what to write in a paper, it makes sense to read articles,
analyze data, and talk to colleagues. Of course, to the social
scientist studying the Columbia economics department, the
nutritional and professional advice we get is just as endogenous as
anything we ourselves do, and so is our reaction to it. Once again,
however, this endogeneity does not concern either our adviser or us.
Our adviser had to decide what advice to give without consulting the
book of her life, and we didn't know what the advice would be until
we got it.
In summary, we should treat ourselves as exogenous in
everything we do, including giving and seeking advice. This
conclusion applies to public as well as private life. We have met the
degree of freedom, and it is us.
4. HOW TO GIVE ADVICE
The first rule of giving advice is you only give it when it's
sought. It's rude to go around giving advice to people who
haven't asked for it. And it's futile, too, because they won't
take it. It's more than a rule of etiquette. It's a rule of
practicality.
-Miss Manners (Judith Martin),
quoted in Rosenbaum [1992].
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The traditional activity of normative economics, giving advice,
can thus be rescued from the determinacy paradox. The practical
questions remains: how should economists give advice? to whom
should they give it?
Let us begin by considering two polar cases. Telling the San
Andreas fault to be quiet is silly. But if a friend you are eager to
see and who is eager to see you calls and asks for directions, you
should obviously comply. What distinguishes these two cases?
On one level the answer is simple: whether it is possible to
construct a good model with the content of your advice as exogenous
(as it should always be), and in this model you can rank the outcomes
that follow different kinds of advice. By a "good model" we mean
just a model that meets the usual criteria we use for judging
models-predictive ability, generality, simplicity, and so forth. By
"rank" we mean a nontrivial ranking where some outcomes are better
than others. Advising the San Andreas fault is not sensible because
there aren't any good geological models where that advice makes a
difference. Giving directions to a friend is sensible because there is
a good model where the friend follows the directions and the result
is happy.
On the next level, the problem is more difficult: what sort of
situations satisfy these critieria? Fortunately, Basu [1989, 1992]
has investigated this game-theoretic question at some length, and
Srinivasan [1989, 1992] has pointed out that some of Basu's results
lack robustness, but two conditions that tend to make advising
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sensible emerge from the analysis. These conditions agree with
common sense.
The first condition is asymmetric information. An adviser has
to know something the advisee doesn't know. Otherwise the adviser
couldn't give advice. Here we are using "know" in the colloquial
sense that implications of known propositions are not necessarily
known (you can know the rules of arithmetic without knowing the
10,000-th digit of pi, even though it follows from the rules of
arithmetic). This condition is fairly easy to meet.
The second condition is coincidence of interests. Players in
zero-sum two-person games don't exchange information.
Coincidence doesn't have to be exact (perhaps you want to see your
friend but not until after the ball game is over), and, at any rate, one
of the things about which an advisee is most likely to be unsure is
an adviser's true motivation. Still, people don't take advice from
their antagonists-Saddam Hussein is unlikely to revise the Iraqi
agricultural price system just because some American economists
tell him that doing so would be nice. As Basu points out, some
asymmetry is involved here: you can get a friend to do what you want
by telling him what you want, but you generally can't get an enemy
to do what you want by telling him what you don't want. If American
economists tell Saddam to raise the price of wheat, he'll ignore
them; he won't lower it. Unless the would-be advisee is truly dim-
witted, an adviser's cleverness is not a good substitute for a true
coincidence of interests.
Here we see another reason why free trade with political
science raises the specter of unemployment for normative
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economists. If the "government" our would-be adviser wants to
influence is something other than a puppet, its interests are likely
to be substantially different from those of economists, and giving
advice to the government will be a waste of time. Short of engaging
in an extraordinarily elaborate swindle, an economist in a country
ruled by a vicious autocrat whose aims she does not approve of
should see no value-added advising the government; an elitist
economist in a democratic, populist country may find herself in a
similar position.
Even if a particular economist cannot advise a particular
president or minister at a particular time, however, all is not lost.
Sometimes the economist will find her goals are close to the goals
of some government officials, or to the goals of some members of
another branch of government like Congress. Then advice about what
the government should do can be freely given and happily received.
More often, though, things will not work out so well, as political
science constantly reminds us. Sometimes there may be no one to
listen to a particular economist's advice. At other times, especially
in developed countries, other opportunities for advising can easily
be found-but only if economists look to citizens rather than
governments as advisees.
The advantages of advising citizens rather than governments
are several. First is information asymmetry: citizens are more
likely to differ from economists in their knowledge than government
officials do, and so can gain more from hearing what economists
have to say.
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The second advantage is a closer coincidence of interests.
Many economists judge a policy proposal not by what it does for
them but by what it does for a lot of the people in society; criteria
like Pareto optimally and distributional equity are basically
"public-regarding." One doesn't win an argument for free trade in a
university seminar by saying, "I like Japanese cameras," and to a
large extent economists have internalized the public-regarding
values that win arguments at university seminars. To this extent,
then, there is some coincidence between what economists say is
good for the public and what really is good for the public; and this
coincidence forms the base for effective advising. If economists do
in fact seek the goals they profess to be seeking when they devise
policies, then those policies should serve the interests of the public
better than they serve the interests of government officials.
Advice that a great deal of the public accepts can make a
difference. Public opinion matters in many good models of politics-
-in the Western democracies at least. If most of the public believed
that AIDS victims were immoral scum who deserved to suffer,
government policies towards AIDS would be different from what
they would be if most of the public believed AIDS victims were
unlucky losers of life's lottery. Economists who influence public
opinion can change government policies.
Advice to citizens is not necessarily advice to aii citizens.
Often only a portion of the public is in position to understand or
accept what an economist is saying. More importantly, often only a
portion of the public will find its interests aligned with those of the
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economist. Not all policies that economists advocate result in
Pareto improvements.
The idea that the role of normative economists is to advise
citizens rather than governments has had a distinguished history; it
is not original with us. Marx and Keynes both saw their job as
advising citizens, and it is difficult to think of more influential
economists.
Marx clearly was not advising the governments of his day-the
coincidence of interests was conspicuously missing. Instead he was
advising the working class--a portion of the public. Keynes, too,
was advising a portion of the public. Even though he sometimes
worked for one government or another, he states in his famous
conclusion to The General Theory [1936] that his goal is to influence
future generations of citizens (and perhaps also madmen who hear
voices in the air). We are advocating a return to the tradition of
Marx and Keynes.
5. CONCLUSION
Whether it is sensible to give advice-the question we
addressed in this paper-- is not the only question that free trade
with political science poses for normative economics. When we look
at the government as something other than a puppet oozing inchoate
benevolence, whatever ethical significance could be ascribed to its
objective function-the social welfare function-vanishes. For if,
as Srinivasan puts it, "the level of a policy instrument is determined
along with the price of chapatis in one grand politico-economic
general equilibrium" [1992, p. 5], the objective function of policy
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makers can have no more ethical significance than the objective
function of chapati makers. On what, then, can normative
economists base their policy recommendations?
This is a large question that needs to be answered in further
work. The implications of endogenous policy making are varied and
deep. In this paper we have examined only one set of implications,
but in that set are conclusions are not surprising: as usual, free
trade is better.
NOTES
1. A great deal of other recent work in public finance, trade, and
macroeconomics also endogenizes government decision-making. See,
for instance, in international economics, Brock and Magee [1978],
Findlay and Wellisz [1982], Feenstra and Bhagwati [1982], Sapir
[1983], Mayer [1984], Dinopoulos [1983], Mayer and Riezman [1987,
1989], Lohmann and O'Halloran [1991]. Enodgenous policy models in
macroeconomics have included Nordhaus [1975], Kydland and
Prescott [1975], Hibbs [1977, 1987], Barro and Gordon [1983],
Canzoneri [1985], Alesina and Sacks [1988], Rogoff and Sibert
[1988], Rogoff [1990], Lohmann [1992], and Harrington [1993]. Work
in public finance includes Peltzman [1980], Becker [1983, 1985],
Oates and Schwab [1988], Glazer [1989], Taylor [1992], Kristov,
Lindert and McClelland [1992], and Gersbach [1993]. And of course,
practically all of the articles in Public Choice , European Journal of
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Political Economy, and Economics and Politics include models of
government decision-making.
2. The uses of these variational exercises are discussed at greater
length in Bhagwati, Brecher, and Srinivasan [1984] and Bhagwati
[1989].
3. Occasionally, of course, constitution writers for, say, a newly
independent society, may find themselves behind a truly thick veil of
ignorance about what their roles in the new society will be. See, for
instance, Bhagwati [1989] for a discussion of some of the
possibilities. But the rarity and the artificiality of these
exceptions shows that they can form no basis for normative
economics.
4. Tabellini-Alesina [1990] make a similar point about balanced
budget amendments.
5. Similarly, positive economics is just as susceptible to the
determinacy paradox in this form as normative economics is. To the
hypothetical social scientist studying us, the content of all the
positive articles Columbia economists will write is also
endogenous, and so poitive economists are at best plagiarists.
Endogeneity is no reason to elevate the positive over the normative.
6. Newcomb's problem is the following: A marvelous being has
appeared on Earth and claimed to be able to predict what people will
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do. This claim has been put to the test a fabulously large number of
times in all manner of circumstances and has always been
confirmed. The predictor has even predicted your own actions
faultlessly on an incredibly large number of occasions.
One day while you are out the predictor comes to your house
and leaves two boxes and a note. One box has a clear plastic lid and
in it you can see $100. The other box is sealed and you can't see
what's in it. The note says: "You may take either both boxes or the
sealed box alone. If I predicted you would take both boxes, I put
nothing in the sealed box. If I predicted you would take only the
sealed box, I put $1 million in it. Choose wisely."
The argument for taking both boxes is the sure-thing principle:
no matter what the predictor put in the sealed box, you're always
going to be $100 better off if you take both boxes. The argument for
taking one box is the principle of maximizing expected utility: if you
take only one box you're almost certain to end up with $1 million
while if you take both boxes you're almost certain to end up with
$100. The philosophical interest in Newcomb's problem comes from
the conflict between the sure-thing principle and the expected
utility principle.
In our context, Newcomb's problem shows that relations with a
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